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Abstract 
A wealth of historical, cultural and biographical evidence points to the fact that there is 
considerable variation in different people’s judgements of creative products. What is 
creative to one person is deviant to another, and creative efforts often fail to be given the 
enthusiastic reception that their creators anticipate and think they deserve. Unpacking the 
roots of these discrepancies, this paper develops an analysis of creativity that is informed by 
the social identity approach. This analysis is supported by a review of previous research that 
points to the way in which perceptions of creativity are structured by both self-
categorization and social norms (and their interaction). Further support for the analysis is 
provided by two experiments (Ns =100,125) which support the hypothesis that ingroup 
products are perceived to be more creative than those of outgroups independently of other 
factors with which group membership is typically correlated in the world at large (e.g., 
quality).  The studies also indicate that this pattern is not simply a manifestation of generic 
ingroup bias since judgements of creativity diverge from those of both likeability (Exp. 1) 
and beauty (Exp. 2).  The theoretical and practical significance of these findings is discussed 
with particular reference to innovation resistance and the “not invented here” syndrome.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social identity and creativity  
 
3 
 
And now for something completely different? 
The impact of group membership on perceptions of creativity 
 
“In 1971 a park keeper at an outdoor exhibition at Arnhem in the Netherlands cleared away a 
sculpture by the minimalist artist Carl Andre thinking it was rubbish” (Cooper, 2005, p. 23)  
This amusing anecdote is actually a reflection a commonplace reality. Specifically, it 
speaks to the fact that there is no universal agreement about what creativity is, how it should 
be recognized, and how it should be evaluated. One musician’s symphony is another’s 
cacophony, one theorist’s genius is another’s idiocy, one artist’s masterpiece is another 
person’s garbage.  
Generally, this inconstancy is considered to be one of the most problematic features 
of creativity because it appears to stand in the way of fully appreciating both its nature and 
its psychological underpinnings. After all, if we cannot agree about what is creative, how 
can we hope to understand either what motivates and engenders creativity or how people 
react to it?  However, arguing against this objectivist position, in this paper we take the view 
that disagreement about creativity — while it can often be a source of social conflict — is 
not scientifically problematic but rather tells us something interesting and informative about 
creativity as a social psychological process.   
Something wondrous strange: The paradox of creativity 
According to the billing it receives in the social and organizational world, creativity 
is an extremely valued commodity. Indeed, a range of influential economic and management 
commentators (e.g. Peter Drucker and Julian Simon) have argued that innovation, and by 
implication creativity, is the single most important economic resource that an organization 
or a society can cultivate and have access to (King & Anderson, 1995; Weiner, 2000). Yet 
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when people are exposed to creativity, they rarely welcome it with open arms, and not 
infrequently regard it with suspicion if not overt hostility (Klein & Sorra, 1996; Ram & 
Sheth, 1989).  As the art critic Robert Hughes (1989) has noted, the new is often greeted 
more with shock and disgust than with gratitude and appreciation.  
The disjunction here points to an apparent paradox surrounding creativity — for 
while it is recommended, imposed, and even ‘sold’ as a panacea capable of driving positive 
forms of social and organizational change, in reality many scientists, artists and business 
people claim that ‘when push comes to shove’ creativity is not valued much at all (Weiner, 
2000).  Thus while people claim to value mould-breaking idiosyncrasy, in fact what they 
display and react positively towards is conformity (Asch, 1951; Jetten, Postmes, & 
McAuliffe, 2002; but see also Moscovici, 1976; Turner, 2006).  
This sense of something contradictory in the dynamics of innovation is consolidated 
by a sense that it is not unusual for the spoils of creativity to go to imitators while those who 
are truly creative are rarely honoured for their endeavour (Weiner, 2000). In science, for 
example, there is a long list of creators for whom this has proved true, including 
Lobachevski (who invented non-Euclidean geometry before Gauss), Semmelweis (who 
discovered a method for avoiding puerperal fever before Pasteur), Matthew (who proposed 
the principle of natural selection nearly 30 years before Darwin or Wallace, and Franklin 
(who identified DNA before Crick and Watson). Moreover, while the genius of these 
individuals was at least acknowledged subsequently, it is clearly the case that there are a 
great many others whose creativity has gone unheralded and whose efforts lie forgotten in 
unmarked graves (e.g., see Howe, 2002; Pizer, 1978).   
A simple and superficial analysis of these contradictions and injustices might seem to 
paint a rather poignant picture in which the business of creativity is dominated by hypocrisy, 
deceit and double standards. Moreover, if as Einstein said, “the secret of genius is knowing 
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how to hide your sources” then it is the fate of true creativity to be forever hidden. In the 
present paper however, we argue that a solution to this apparent paradox is made possible by 
rethinking the nature of the creativity and abandoning the illusion that it is a single and 
unified construct. Instead, we argue that creativity is always grounded in the relativity of 
social life, reflecting the fact that it occurs in social contexts (Stein, 1974) and is embedded 
in social systems (Csikszentmihalyi, 1998) upon which perceivers can have many differing 
perspectives (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994).  
For this reason, as we have argued elsewhere (Adarves-Yorno, Postmes & Haslam, 
2006, 2007), conceptions of creativity need to recognize the importance of perceivers, and 
of the wider group context within which their evaluations take place (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1998). Consequently, to understand perceptions of creativity we need to channel our 
energies away from a quest to discover the universal properties of objects and acts that make 
them creative, and move instead towards an appreciation of ways in which the dynamics of 
creativity are structured by the social psychological interplay between creators, perceivers 
and their proximate and distal social context.  
In this regard one of the key relational factors which is seen to structure evaluations 
of creativity in real-life settings is group membership (Simonton, 1984; Stein, 2003) — in 
particular, those group memberships that furnish both creators and perceivers with a sense of 
social identity in any given context (Tajfel, 1972). Moreover, when attending to the role of 
group memberships in structuring perceptions and acts of creativity, the social identity 
approach (incorporating both social identity and self-categorization theories; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) provides a comprehensive 
framework within which relational factors (e.g., group membership) and other group-related 
factors can be understood.  
Social identity and creativity  
 
6 
In line with this perspective, this paper reviews the social identity approach to 
creativity, summarizes two empirical lines of research, and goes on to report two 
experiments that explore the impact of group membership on perceptions of creativity.  The 
core point that these studies make is that perceptions of creativity are grounded in shared 
social identity — so that in order to be seen (and valued) as creative a given artefact needs to 
be seen as emanating from ‘us’ rather than ‘them’.       
The social identity approach to creativity 
One basic premise of the social identity approach is that there is not one unique self 
underlying all our actions and responses. Instead the self is comprised of personal identity 
and as many social identities as there are groups to which we perceive ourselves as 
belonging (e.g., Turner, 1982). On this basis, individuals can categorize themselves either as 
individual persons or as members of particular groups. For example, a British minimalist 
artist, Mary, can categorize herself as an individual (i.e., Mary), as a member of her artistic 
group (i.e., a minimalist sculptor), as a citizen of her country (i.e., British), or as a woman. 
Importantly too, whether she categorizes herself as an individual or as a member of a given 
group will have important consequences for both her perceptions and her behavior (Turner, 
Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994).  
As an individual, Mary will define herself in terms of a personal identity and her 
own idiosyncratic characteristics (Turner, 1982). Consequently, when personal identity is 
salient (such that Mary defines herself as “I”), personal style and preferences will have an 
impact on her creations and her perceptions of creativity. Here, then, individuals’ creations 
are (a) more likely to reflect their own idiosyncratic style, and (b) their evaluations of other 
creations are likely to be guided by their personal preferences (unless the context determines 
otherwise).  
In contrast, when a given social identity is salient, individuals internalize relevant 
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group characteristics and in turn, derive significant aspects of their sense of self from the 
group (defining the self as “we”).  So, for example, when Mary’s social identity as a 
minimalist is salient she is interested in keeping things minimal. Put slightly differently, 
when a given social identity becomes salient, individuals perceive themselves more in terms 
of the shared attributes that define their social category and less in terms of their unique 
individuating characteristics (Turner, 1982, 1991). Consequently, when social identity is 
salient, creative behavior and perceptions of creativity are more likely to be informed by 
group values, preferences and norms. For example, when Mary defines herself as a 
minimalist, she will be more likely to create and evaluate other creations with reference to 
the preferences, tastes, norms, values, rules and guidelines of minimalism.  
This distinction between personal and social identity has proved to be tremendously 
useful in predicting and understanding people’s perceptions and behavior in a range of 
social and organizational contexts (e.g., see Haslam, 2001). Along the lines of previous 
work which shows that leadership is a product of social identity and self-categorization 
processes (e.g., Haslam & Platow, 2001; Hogg, 2001; Turner & Haslam, 2001), it clearly 
also has relevance to perceptions and actions associated with displays of creativity. 
Accordingly, in order to understand the dynamics of creativity, we need to understand not 
only what makes a given social identity salient but also what it is that defines social identity 
content (e.g., norms, tastes etc.), in any given setting (e.g., Stein, 2003).  
Identification 
Social identification can be defined as the extent to which a given group is valued 
and self-involving such that an individual considers membership of it to be an important part 
of their self definition (e.g. Doosje & Ellemers, 1997; Doosje, Ellemers & Spears, 1995; 
Turner, 1999). When someone identifies strongly with a given group, he or she will be more 
likely to interpret reality and behave in a manner consistent with that group’s values, 
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ideology and norms (Turner, 1991). Social identification is closely associated with 
commitment to the group and involvement in its efforts and products (Ellemers, de Gilder, 
& Haslam, 2004; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999). As a result, identification (like 
social identity salience) should be associated with the degree to which a person is willing 
and able to recognize the creativity of a novel proposal that emerges from, and is endorsed 
by, the group, and is seen to reflect and promote its values. As with social identity salience, 
then, to the extent that Mary identifies with minimalist artists (a) her creations are more 
likely to follow minimalist conventions and (b) she is more likely to perceive other 
minimalist creations to be creative and superior.  
To test these ideas, we conducted a study to explore the prediction that social 
identification would be positively correlated with the recognition of creativity (Adarves-Yorno, 
2005). Here undergraduate students evaluated the novel ideas of a student representative (e.g. 
giving students the power to design academic courses) and their identification with other 
students from the university was also measured. As predicted, perceptions of creativity 
increased as a function of identification: the higher students’ ingroup identification, the more 
they perceived the ingroup representative’s ideas to be creative (Adarves-Yorno, 2005, also see 
Adarves-Yorno et al., 2006). 
Social identity salience and group norms 
We noted above that one of the core predictions of self-categorization theory is that 
when personal identity is salient, individuals’ perceptions will be informed more by their 
idiosyncratic preferences than when social identity is salient and they are more likely to see 
the world and act in a manner consistent with group norms (Reicher, 1984; Spears, Lea & 
Lee, 1990; Wilder & Shapiro, 1984; Turner et al., 1994). When it comes to perceptions of 
creativity, one implication of this is that when personal identity is salient and a particular 
group norm is made explicit, people will tend either to ignore the norm or to deviate from it 
Social identity and creativity  
 
9 
as a means of expressing their individuality (Jetten et al., 2002). Accordingly, these 
individuals should consider an idea to be more creative if it deviates from the norm. 
However, when a given social identity is salient people’s perceptions are more likely to be 
informed by relevant group norms and they will tend to consider ideas and products to be 
more creative if they fall within the relevant normative boundaries of the ingroup.   
Two studies were conducted to test these arguments (Adarves-Yorno et al., 2006). 
The first explored the impact of identity salience (personal vs. social) and group norm 
(conservative vs. progressive) on the evaluation of a conservative proposal. To make 
personal identity salient, participants were asked to list three things that distinguished 
themselves as unique individuals. To make social identity salient participants were asked to 
list three things that they had in common with others in their group (after Haslam, Oakes, 
Reynolds, & Turner, 1999). The group norm was manipulated using a fictitious research 
report which informed participants that students at their university were either conservative 
or progressive. Subsequently, participants were asked to rate a conservative proposal in 
terms of its creativity.  
In line with predictions, results indicated that when personal identity was salient 
participants used the norm as a reference point from which they sought to deviate. That is, 
when thinking of themselves as individuals they perceived the conservative idea to be 
relatively less creative when the group norm was conservative than when the norm was 
progressive. On the other hand, when social identity was salient, participants’ perceptions of 
creativity were much more aligned with the group norm. That is, here they perceived the 
conservative idea to be more creative when it was congruent with the ingroup norm (to be 
conservative) than when it was incongruent. Put slightly differently, participants whose 
personal identity was salient perceived ideas to be relatively more creative when they fell 
outside the group’s normative boundaries, whereas participants whose social identity was 
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made salient perceived ideas to be creative when they fell within the boundaries of group 
norms.  
This study provides support for the argument that perceptions of creativity are 
structured by normative context in interaction with self-categorization processes. However, 
the study does not distinguish creativity from other forms of positive judgement. 
Accordingly, a second study (Adarves-Yorno et al., 2006, Study 2) was conducted to 
replicate Study 1 and disentangle perceptions of creativity from other forms of positive 
reaction. Theoretically, we argue that the two constructs should indeed be different —  with 
creativity judgments being a question of social value that is grounded in group norms (e.g., 
Amabile, 1996; Martindale, 1990) while assessments of positivity are more likely to be 
shaped by other (non-normative) factors. One of these other factors is personal relevance. In 
general, we would expect that when good ideas are relevant for someone, then they will tend 
to evaluate those ideas as being more positive but not necessarily more creative.  
To test this idea, in a second study, participants’ social identity as students at their 
University was made salient throughout the study. Two factors were then manipulated: the 
social norms of the superordinate category (suggesting that students at the University were 
pro-technology vs. pro-culture), and the personal relevance of the proposals (selecting 
students from technology-focused or culture-focused faculties). As in the previous study, 
group norms were manipulated by providing participants with conclusions from a fictitious 
research report. In the pro-culture condition, the conclusions of the report led participants to 
think that students were in favor of cultural activities (e.g., wanting more culture, music, and 
art at the university). In the pro-technology condition, the conclusions of the report led 
participants to think that students were more in favor of technological advance (e.g., wanting 
more on-line resources, greater access to computer facilities, and on-line contact with 
teaching staff). 
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After having gone through the norm-induction procedure, participants then had to 
evaluate ideas which proposed using technology as a basis for taking the University forward  
(i.e., a proposal congruent with the pro-technology norm but not with the pro-culture norm). 
Participants evaluated these ideas on two dimensions: creativity (i.e., as being creative and 
innovative) and positivity (i.e., as being good and appropriate). Results confirmed our 
predictions: group norms had a significant bearing on perceptions of creativity but had far 
less impact on positive evaluations. On the other hand, the positivity of participants’ 
reactions varied significantly as a function of the proposals’ personal relevance but this 
factor did not have as much impact on perceptions of creativity.   
These results replicated those of Study 1 and also showed that although perceptions 
of creativity and positivity are related, they are independently affected by different factors, 
and therefore both conceptually and empirically distinguishable. In this way, the findings 
support the argument that evaluations of creativity are dependent on normative criteria (as 
argued by Amabile, 1996).  However, beyond this, they suggest that these social and 
normative processes interact with self-categorization processes that serve to make particular 
norms more or less relevant in different contexts. 
In reflecting on the broader significance of the results of the foregoing studies, one 
important note of caution is warranted. This is because a simple interpretation of the 
findings might lead one to the conclusion that groups place much greater stock in 
conformity than in creativity (typically understood as “doing things differently”). This 
inference is consistent with a range of arguments presented in the social psychological 
literature on groups (e.g., Janis’s, 1972, groupthink hypothesis; Deutsch & Gerard’s, 1955, 
model of normative influence), as well as with a great deal of popular thinking about 
creativity (as epitomized by Bernice Fitz-Gibbon’s dictum that “creativity varies inversely 
with the number of cooks involved in the broth”). However, such a conclusion ignores the 
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fact that when the norm is to do things differently, more conformity to the norm is 
automatically translated into more creativity (at least as it is commonly understood; for a 
similar argument about the impact of norms of individualism and collectivism, see Jetten et 
al., 2002). This, in turn, alerts us two important points.  First, that creativity and conformity 
are neither independent nor mutually exclusive, as is commonly claimed. Second, that there 
are grounds for revisiting the idea that groups and group members are less creative than 
individuals. For ultimately it is neither groups nor individuals’ self-categorization that 
determines perceptions and acts of creativity, but rather the interaction of these with the 
content of salient group norms.  
The present research 
As a means of testing ideas at the heart of the social identity approach, the present 
research explores the impact of group membership on perceptions of creativity. Self-
categorization theory (Turner, et al., 1987, 1994) argues that the recognition of shared group 
membership (i.e., belonging to the same ingroup) is a key determinant of people’s 
willingness to engage with others (Turner, 1991). That is, when people consider others to be 
ingroup members (so that they define those others and themselves as “us”), they should be 
more positively inclined towards them and more persuaded of the value of what they say 
and do (see also Mackie & Cooper, 1984). Specifically, ingroup members expect to have 
shared understandings and perceptions of issues that are important to their group 
membership (Turner, 1991; Turner & Oakes, 1989; see also Haslam, McGarty, Brown, 
Eggins, Morrison, & Reynolds, 1998; Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005). In other words, a 
sense of shared social self-categorization leads people to anticipate that ingroup perceptions 
on group-relevant dimensions will converge (see also Asch, 1951, p. 484).  
In relation to creativity, a direct implication of this argument is that products and 
ideas are more likely to be perceived as creative and regarded favorably when they emerge 
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from an ingroup than when they emerge from an outgroup. Specifically, it can be argued 
that one basic requirement for products and ideas to be perceived and accepted as creative is 
that their creators should be considered a member of a psychological ingroup — that is, they 
need to be considered “one of us” (Haslam et al., 2001).  
This phenomenon can be observed in a range of real-life settings. For example, in 
artistic domains, people often display ethnocentric bias when evaluating other people’s 
creations (see Simonton, 1984). Furthermore, in organizational domains, insiders are often 
found to reject, outsiders’ contributions by displaying what is referred to as an “NIH” 
attitude —  so that if they are "not invented here" by one of us, they are seen as no good 
(Katz & Allen, 1991; Ragatz, Handfield, & Scannell, 1993; Stein, 2003). Here we report two 
studies that explore this phenomenon experimentally.  
Experiment 1 
This first study tests the assertion that people will perceive ideas to be more creative 
when those ideas are proposed by an ingroup rather than by an outgroup. In line with the 
arguments developed above, the study is designed to demonstrate the point that shared group 
membership is implicated in the recognition of creativity and is a potentially significant 
determinant of whether or not people willing to respond positively to innovation.  
In the study we assessed participants’ evaluation of ideas that supposedly emanated 
from ingroup and outgroup sources on dimensions of creativity and liking. Our primary 
hypothesis was that the ideas of an ingroup would be seen as more creative than those of 
outgroup.  We also expected that the ingroup’s ideas would be liked more than those of the 
outgroup. However, following Adarves-Yorno et al. (2005, 2006), our secondary hypothesis 
was that the effects of group membership on perceived creativity would reflect more than 
liking alone — and hence would not simply reflect of ingroup bias.        
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Method 
Participants and Design 
British participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions in 
which they evaluated the creativity of ideas which ostensibly originated either from an 
ingroup source (other British people) or from an outgroup source (Dutch people). 
Participants were 100 British respondents who visited the BBC Science web pages, and who 
chose to take part in an online experiment. Prior to responding on the main dependent 
measures participants’ British identity was made salient by asking them to identify three 
things that they liked about being British and that they had in common with other British 
people (after Haslam et al., 1999).  
Procedure 
The study was conducted in 2002 shortly after the British Broadcasting Company 
(BBC) had broadcast “The Experiment” (Koppel & Mirsky, 2002) —  a series of four one-
hour documentaries covering events in the BBC Prison Study (Reicher & Haslam, 2006). 
Using the same paradigm as the Stanford Prison Experiment (Haney, Banks & Zimbardo, 
1973), the study’s primary goal was to examine the contribution of group membership and 
social identification to processes of tyranny and resistance (e.g., see Haslam & Reicher, 
2006, 2007).   
Having seen the television programmes, on-line participants were presented with 
three novel (fictitious) proposals for following up this programme: “To repeat ‘The 
Experiment’ with the same participants, but with the guards in the position of the prisoners 
and vice versa”; “To conduct the ‘The Experiment’ with participants from different cultures 
(Asian, European, Africans)”; “To run ‘The Experiment’ using real-life groups, such as 
bosses and employees in an organization”. In different conditions they were told that these 
proposals originated from an ingroup source (a discussion group on a British website) or an 
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outgroup source (a discussion group on a Dutch website). The order of presentation of the 
proposals was counterbalanced.   
Participants were presented with each proposal one at a time, and were then simply 
asked to indicate to what extent they considered each proposal to be creative and to what 
extent they liked the proposal. Responses were made on seven-point scales ranging from 
“not at all” (1) to “very much” (7).  
Results and Discussion 
There was reasonably high degree of correspondence in evaluation of the three proposals 
(for creativity α = .58, for liking α =  .55). Accordingly, responses to the separate proposals were 
aggregated to provide single measures of perceived creativity and liking. 
Results of a t-test provided support for the hypothesis that proposals would be seen 
to be more creative when their source was an ingroup (M=4.46, SD=.90) rather than an 
outgroup (M=3.76, SD=1.23), t(97)=3.24, p=.002. As expected, it was also found that 
participants liked ingroup ideas more (M=4.47, SD=.86) than outgroup ideas (M=4.01, 
SD=1.25) t(97)=2.11, p=.037.   
There was also a significant correlation between ratings of creativity and liking, 
r=.70, p<.01 — a finding which suggests that perceptions of creativity correspond to 
patterns of ingroup bias generally observed when ingroup and outgroup products are 
evaluated (e.g., Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Indeed, one potential explanation of 
these results is that they simply constitute another example of ingroup bias. To address this 
point, supplementary ANCOVA was performed in order to control for the effects of 
likeability when estimating the impact of group membership on perceptions of creativity.  
Against the idea that the observed patterns were simply a product of ingroup favoritism, this 
analysis indicated that, when correcting for likeability, the effect of group membership on 
creativity perceptions still remained strong, F(1,96)=5.86, p=.017. This supports our 
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secondary hypothesis in suggesting that group membership structures perceptions of 
creativity over-and-above its impact on likeability (along lines suggested by Adarves-Yorno, 
2005, see also Adarves-Yorno et al., 2006).  
In summary, this first study shows quite straightforwardly that group membership 
determines how people respond to creative products (in this case ideas) generated by others. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that perceptions of creativity are underpinned by more than 
mere likeability. It remains true, however, that creativity may be a product of forms of bias 
other than those associated with liking per se. In order to address this possibility a second 
study was conducted. 
Experiment 2 
The design and rationale for this experiment was very similar to that of Experiment 
1, but it incorporated three small differences. First, to lend further support to the claim that 
perceptions of creativity are not simply a product of ingroup bias, this study explored the 
impact of group membership not only on evaluations of creativity but also on perceptions of 
beauty. Second, here participants did not evaluate ideas (as in Study 1) but rather tangible 
creations: a university promotional leaflet. Third, the study employed a within-subjects 
design in order to reduce experimental complexities and confounds.  
As in Study 1, our primary hypothesis was that perceptions of creativity would be 
structured by group membership — with ingroup products being seen as more creative than 
outgroup products. It was also expected that group membership might also impact on 
perceptions of beauty (with ingroup products seen as more beautiful than outgroup ones; see 
Sherrard, 1995).  However, as with judgments of liking in the previous study, our secondary 
hypothesis was that evaluations of creativity and beauty would be empirically distinct — so 
that perceptions of creativity would reflect more than merely the positive evaluation of the 
ingroup and its output (Adarves-Yorno et al., 2005, 2006).   
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Method 
Participants and design 
In a two-condition within-subjects design, students at the University of Exeter 
evaluated the creativity and beauty of university leaflets ostensibly created by an ingroup 
member (a student from the University of Exeter) and an outgroup member (a student from 
Bruistol University). Participants were 125 first-year undergraduate students (99 women and 
26 men) who were taking part in a Team Development Day
1
. 
Procedure  
Prior to taking part in the main study (and ostensibly as part of a different exercise) 
participants’ identity as Exeter students was made salient by asking them to identify three 
things that they had in common with and liked about other Exeter students (after Haslam et 
al., 1999). After this, each student was individually presented with a black and white 
photocopy of two promotional leaflets both describing the attractions of university life.  
One leaflet was supposedly created by an Exeter student (an ingroup member) and 
one supposedly created by a Bristol student (an outgroup member). The main part of each 
leaflet was composed of four images and around ten words (9 for Exeter’s leaflet and 12 for 
Bristol’s leaflet). The images were taken from university prospectuses and were equivalent 
in terms of (a) size, (b) composition and (c) content: two of the images for each leaflet were 
related to academic aspects of university life (e.g., showing people working with computers) 
and two were related to more social aspects (e.g., showing people laughing at a social 
event). The words of each leaflet were equivalent in terms of (a) size, (b) the space they 
occupied on the leaflet and (c) content (containing words typically used in material of this 
form — e.g., indicating that university life is ‘stimulating’ and ‘good fun’).  Both leaflets 
were composed of 90% images and 10% words and were carefully created so as to be 
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aesthetically equivalent (an equivalence subsequently confirmed by participants’ ratings of 
their beauty; see below).   
Participants evaluated leaflets on the dimensions of creativity and beauty. Creativity 
was measured with the single item “How creative do you consider the leaflet to be?” Beauty 
was measured with the single item “How beautiful do you consider the leaflet to be?”  
Participants responded to both items using nine-point rating scales ranging from “not al all” 
(1) to “very much” (9). 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analysis indicated that there were no effects for leaflet content or order 
of presentation. Accordingly, participants’ responses were collapsed across these factors 
with evaluations of ingroup and outgroup leaflets analysed by means of paired t-tests. Here a 
comparison of ratings of the leaflets’ perceived creativity provided strong support for our 
primary hypothesis — with leaflets being seen to be more creative when they were said to 
have been designed by an ingroup (M=3.92, SD=1.67) rather than from an outgroup 
(M=3.54, SD=1.58), t(124)=2.93, p<.001.  
Although perceptions of the leaflets’ creativity were correlated with perceptions of 
beauty (for one leaflet r=.63, for the other r=.64, both ps<.01), the ingroup leaflet was 
considered no more beautiful (M=3.05, SD=1.45) than the outgroup leaflet (M=3.03, 
SD=1.43), t(123)=0.19, p=.85.  This null effect was unexpected, but nevertheless it is in line 
with our secondary hypothesis, in suggesting that judgements of creativity are theoretically 
and empirically distinguishable disentangled from judgements of positivity per se.  This 
result thus provides further support for the claim that perceptions of creativity are more than 
simply a reflection of ingroup bias.    
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General Discussion 
The results of the above studies provide consistent evidence that creators’ group 
membership impacts substantially on other people’s perceptions of their creativity, and, as a 
corollary, that perceivers’ group membership impacts substantially on their evaluations of 
other people’s creativity. In this, the findings resonate with assertions made in previous 
work which point to the patterning of judgements of creativity in artistic domains (Sherrard, 
1995; Simonton, 1984) and the so-called NIH phenomenon whereby innovative ideas are 
responded to far less enthusiastically if they are “not invented here” (Katz & Allen, 1991; 
Ragatz et al., 1993; Stein, 2003). In these real-life examples, however, it is unclear whether 
the outcomes that are observed represent specific judgments of creativity or reflect more 
generic forms of ingroup favoritism (along lines observed by Tajfel, 1970; see also Doise et 
al., 1972) or indeed whether they are a reflection of real differences (e.g., in quality).  
Perhaps people see novel ingroup products to be more creative because they simply like the 
ingroup more than outgroups, or because ingroup products in fact are more creative than 
those of outgroups.    
In this regard, the present findings make two simple but nonetheless important 
contributions to the literature on creativity. First, they show through controlled 
experimentation that group membership (and not the factors with which it is routinely 
correlated in the world at large — e.g., quality, status, power, experience) is an important 
determinant of the perceived creativity of ideas (Experiment 1) and objects (Experiment 2).  
Second, they show that the influence of this factor is not simply a manifestation of generic 
ingroup bias since judgements of creativity diverge from those of both likeability 
(Experiment 1) and beauty (Experiment 2). 
In line with the body of research reviewed earlier in this paper, the findings also 
point to the way in which social (group-based) factors are central to the dynamics of 
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creativity. An interesting case study of such dynamics is provided by the professional 
trajectory of Paul Cézanne — an artist whose work in the late 19
th
 century is credited with 
having paved the way for the shift from impressionism to cubism (e.g., Lindsay, 1969).  For 
the first five years that Cézanne submitted his work to the official Paris Salon (from 1864-9) 
it was consistently rejected because it did not comply with the norms of contemporary 
impressionism. Commenting on his work, those who reviewed his work saw it not as 
creative but as simply bad.  
The present and previous work in the social identity tradition suggests two 
interrelated reasons for this — both of which appear to be borne out by biographical analysis 
(e.g., see Lindsay, 1969).  First, and most straightforwardly, Cézanne’s work was rejected 
because his art failed to live up to (i.e., did not conform to) the prevailing artistic standards 
of the day. Related to this, though, social identity theorizing also suggests that, in his 
painting (as well as in his life more generally), Cézanne (in common with other artists like 
Van Gogh) had failed to demonstrate to those in positions of influence at the time (i.e., 
traditional impressionists) that he was “one of us”.  And because he was an outsider (or at 
least not clearly an ingroup member) those assessors were less willing (or able) to see the 
value in the new forms of representation that his art championed.  
Consideration of these points allows us to explain some of the apparent 
contradictions and paradoxes that surround the treatment meted out to creators when they 
attempt to launch their products on the world. As we noted at the start of this paper, those 
individuals typically (and understandably) react with dismay, first, when their own acts of 
creativity are rejected, and second, when those same ideas are subsequently proposed by 
someone else and are received favourably.  The biography of Rosalind Franklin provides 
another interesting case study that speaks to these issues (Sayre, 1975).  As a female, 
suffragette and socialist her pioneering work generating X-ray images of the structure of 
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DNA (e.g., Franklin & Gosling, 1953) met with only faint acclaim in the male-dominated 
world of conservative scientists, and was massively overshadowed by the subsequent work 
of Watson and Crick (e.g., 1953). Indeed, Franklin’s work only gained general recognition 
once a community of other female scientists had developed in the 1980s — by which time 
there (a) had been changes to the nature of the scientific community and its norms and (b) 
there was a group of other non-conservative, non-male scientists explicitly championing 
both her and her contribution.  
Had Franklin consulted the literature on creativity it is unlikely that she would have 
found much there to console or aid her in her quest for recognition. Illustrative of this point, 
a trawl through quotations relating to the basis of creativity (e.g., Thomas Tripp, 1973) 
provides would-be creators with hundreds of practical recommendations (e.g., suggesting 
that they consult their “inner child”, forgo wealth and worldly possession, have no children, 
undergo suffering and torment, or find someone to argue with and be despised by). It is 
undoubtedly the case that such processes may have a role to play in prompting people to be 
creative; however, they have precious little to say about how the fruits of any labour will be 
received, and this is a subject on which these same sources are curiously silent.   
To the extent that others’ reactions are likely to have a significant bearing on the 
ramifications of creative acts (Csikszentmihalyi, 1998; Howe, 2002) and their capacity to 
bring about social change, this oversight seems glaring. One major contribution of the social 
identity approach is to place such considerations centre-stage in the process of encouraging 
a properly social psychological theory of creativity.  This sees both the drive to create and 
the form of creation to be grounded in social identity (e.g., Ellemers et al., 2004), but also 
sees others’ social identities as a determinant both of how such acts are received, and of 
what impact they ultimately have.   
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Significantly too, as Franklin’s contribution to science shows, it is clear that we need 
to understand this impact, like social identity itself, as not only dynamic but also ongoing — 
about becoming not just being (Reicher, 2000). In this regard, the most powerful forms of 
creativity may well be those that change the way we see ourselves and which promote social 
change because they create a new audience to appreciate and act upon them (Reicher, 
Haslam & Platow, 2007).  Indeed, by this logic, successful creators are not necessarily those 
who have the best or the most novel ideas, but rather those who help create new forms of 
community to recognize and celebrate their greatness.                                  
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Footnote 
1.  The Team Development Day was comprised of a number of group activities. Within 
these activities several related creativity experiments were conducted. Using the same 
students as participants, one of the between-subjects experiments explored the impact of 
group norms and team identity salience on (a) creative behavior and (b) perceptions of 
creativity (see Adarves-Yorno et al., 2007, Study 1). However, the fact that the same 
participants were used had no impact on the present experiment. The present study has a 
within-subjects design and university student identity was made salient to all 
participants. To ensure that we could safely analyse the impact of group membership (as 
a within-subject factor) independently of the between-subjects manipulation, a repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted using group norm and team identity salience as 
between-subject factors. Results showed that norm and team identity salience had no 
impact on perceptions of creativity (creativity X norm p =.856, creativity X salience, 
p=.257;  creativity X norm X salience, p=.973) or perceptions of beauty (beauty X norm p 
=.317; beauty X salience p=795; beauty X norm X salience, p=.596). For the purposes of 
this paper, and aiming for clarity and parsimony, we have decided to treat the within-
subjects data as belonging to an unrelated experiment. For this reason, only details of the 
within-subjects manipulation are reported here.  
 
